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OPINION OF THE COURT 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Simon A. Barber appeals from the district court's entry of 
judgment in favor of his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc., 
following a jury verdict in favor of Barber. Barber sued under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 
(1988) ("ADEA"), alleging discriminatory failure to promote and 
retaliation for his assertion of his discrimination claim. 
Although we agree that defendants3 were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on Barber's retaliation claim, we hold that the 
district court improperly overturned the jury's finding that 
defendants' failure to promote Barber was in violation of the 
ADEA.  Therefore, we will reverse in part and remand to the 
district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Simon Barber has been employed by CSX Transportation or its 
predecessors for the last thirty-eight years.  During his tenure 
with CSX, Barber has served in various capacities of increasing 
responsibility and has received numerous merit or performance 
                     
3
      Although in substance Barber's claims appear to involve 
only his employer as the sole defendant, hereinafter we refer to 
"defendants" to be consistent with the district court's opinion, 
the language in Barber's brief and the caption in this matter. 
3 
salary increases and letters of commendation.  In February of 
1987, Barber took the position of Chief Clerk essentially serving 
as the office manager in defendants' Pittsburgh sales office. The 
position of Territorial Account Executive became available in 
that office in March of 1990, and was posted on the company wide 
computer system.  The Territorial Account Executive was 
responsible for the design, marketing and sale of CSX services. 
 Eight applications were submitted for the Territorial 
Account Executive position.  CSX's Human Resources Department 
screened the applications and determined that only four of the 
applicants met the minimum qualifications.  Those four were: 
 (1)  Scott Delasandro, age 37 -- one year of 
railroad experience and no sales experience.   
 
 (2)  Kathy Ball, age 44 -- twenty years of 
railroad experience, fifteen of which were in 
accounting and five of which were in telemarketing.   
 
 (3)  Andrew Kelly, age 53 -- thirty-four years of 
railroad experience including his position as Sales 
Representative in the Pittsburgh sales office at the 
time he applied for the Territorial Account Executive 
position.   
 
 (4)  Plaintiff, Simon Barber, then age 52 --
thirty-four years of railroad experience, including 
fourteen years of railroad sales experience and seven 
years of customer service experience. 
 Robert Edmonds, Director of Sales in the Pittsburgh sales 
office, was Barber's supervisor at the time, and was responsible 
for selecting the Territorial Account Executive whom Edmonds 
would also supervise.  Edmonds interviewed the two younger 
applicants, Scott Delasandro and Kathy Ball, both of whom worked 
in the Baltimore regional office.  Although he did not interview 
Andrew Kelly, Edmonds informally discussed the position with 
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Kelly after Kelly submitted his application.  However, Kelly 
withdrew his application after learning the salary.  Edmonds did 
not interview or discuss the position with Barber.   
 Even though Edmonds did not formally interview either Kelly 
or Barber, Edmonds filled out an "Interview Report Form" for both 
of those applicants as well as for the two applicants whom he did 
interview.  That interview report, dated April 5, 1990, stated 
that Barber was "qualified but [did] not possess the credentials 
of Kathy Ball" who was selected.  Interestingly, Kathy Ball's 
interview report was dated May 2, 1990, nearly a month after she 
was actually selected.  
 On May 23, 1990, Barber wrote a letter to defendants' Human 
Resources Department questioning Edmonds' decision to award the 
position to Ball whom Barber felt was less experienced and less 
qualified than he was.  Specifically, Barber's letter stated: 
 I recently submitted a Job Application 
Form for the position of Territorial Account 
Executive (Job Vacancy No. 199) at 
Pittsburgh, PA. 
 
 Mr. Robert W. Edmonds, Jr., Director-
Sales, Pittsburgh, has informed me the 
position has been awarded to Ms. Kathy Ball 
from Telemarketing at Baltimore.  In view of 
my 21 years of experience in this field (14 
years direct sales and 7 years customer 
service), I am quite puzzled as to why the 
position was awarded to a less qualified 
individual. 
 
 I would greatly appreciate your response 
as to why I was not awarded this job. 
  
App. at 363.  Shortly thereafter, Edmonds called Barber into his 
office and expressed disappointment over that complaint.  On 
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November 28, 1990, Barber received notification that, as of 
December 5, 1990, his position as Chief Clerk was being 
eliminated as a result of a company wide reduction in force. 
Edmonds made the decision to eliminate Barber's position of Chief 
Clerk after receiving a mandate from management to eliminate one 
of three clerical positions in the Pittsburgh sales office.4   
 On May 13, 1992, Barber filed this action in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
Barber's complaint alleged violations of the ADEA, gender 
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§2000 et seq. (1988) ("Title VII"), and unlawful retaliation 
under both the ADEA and Title VII.  The resulting trial was 
bifurcated and issues of liability were severed from any 
determination of damages.  Barber's age discrimination claims 
were tried to a jury while his Title VII sex discrimination and 
retaliation claims were tried to the court. The court found in 
favor of CSX on Barber's Title VII claims and Barber does not 
appeal that ruling. However, the jury found that CSX violated the 
ADEA by failing to promote Barber because of age discrimination 
and by retaliating against him when he voiced his displeasure at 
not being promoted. Following trial, the court granted a defense 
motion for judgment as a matter of law on both the age 
discrimination and retaliation claims, notwithstanding the jury's 
                     
4
      The three clerical positions in the Pittsburgh sales 
office consisted of two Secretary-Typists and one Chief Clerk. 
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special verdicts in favor of Barber.  Barber now appeals that 
ruling.5 
II. DISCUSSION 
 We exercise plenary review of the district court's entry of 
an order granting CSX's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
See Intermilo, Inc. v. I.P. Enterprises, Inc., 19 F.3d 890, 892 
(3d Cir. 1994); Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 
259 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989) (motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict).  Therefore, we must 
apply the same standard to this record as the district court. See 
Berndt v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 789 F.2d 253 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  We afford de novo review to the district court's 
conclusions of law, but review factual findings to "determine 
whether the evidence and justifiable inferences most favorable to 
[Barber] afford any rational basis for the verdict."  Bhaya, 832 
F.2d at 259. 
 
 A.  AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 
 The ADEA prohibits age discrimination in employment against 
an individual over age 40.  29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1).  Because the 
prohibition against age discrimination contained in the ADEA is 
similar in text, tone, and purpose to the prohibition against 
discrimination contained in Title VII, courts routinely look to 
                     
5
     In their cross-appeal, defendants seek review of the 
district court's conditional ruling denying their motion for a 
new trial under Rule 59.  Because we are affirming the district 
court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants on 
Barber's retaliation claim, we need not address the issues raised 
in the cross appeal. 
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law developed under Title VII to guide an inquiry under the ADEA. 
See, e.g., Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).  Thus, we follow the 
evidentiary framework first set forth by the Supreme Court in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 
subsequently refined in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and recently clarified in St. 
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,    U.S.   , 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). 
In addition, Barber's failure to promote claim is analogous to a 
claim of failure to hire.  Thus, in order to make out a prima 
facie case, Barber must show "1) that he belongs to the protected 
class, 2) that he applied for and was qualified for the job, 3) 
that despite his qualifications he was rejected, and 4) that the 
employer either ultimately filled the position with someone 
sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age discrimination 
or continued to seek applicants from among those having 
plaintiff's qualifications."  Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 
61 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). 
 Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case the law 
creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination, and the 
defendant employer must articulate a "legitimate 
nondiscriminatory explanation for the employer's adverse 
employment action."  Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 432 
(3d Cir. 1994).  If the employer puts forth a legitimate business 
explanation, "then the presumption of discriminatory intent 
created by the employee's prima facie case is rebutted and the 
presumption simply `drops out of the picture.'"  Id. (quoting 
8 
Hicks,    U.S. at   , 113 S. Ct. at 2749).  The plaintiff then 
has an opportunity to show that the reasons proffered by the 
employer were a pretext for what, in reality, was a 
discriminatory motivation.  See id.  Of course, the ultimate 
burden to prove discrimination on the basis of age (burden of 
persuasion) remains with the plaintiff at all times.  Hicks,   
U.S. at   , 113 S. Ct. at 2749;  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Bhaya, 
832 F.2d at 260. 
 The district court found that Barber established a prima 
facie case from which an inference of age discrimination could be 
drawn.  Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., No. 92-1241, slip op. 
at 2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1994).  Defendants contest that ruling 
arguing that Barber failed to establish the fourth element of a 
prima facie case -- that the employer filled the position with 
someone sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age 
discrimination.  We agree with the district court's conclusion 
that Barber established a prima facie case.  It is undisputed 
that Barber was 52 years of age when he was rejected for the 
position of Territorial Account Executive, and the successful 
candidate was 44.  Defendants, without citation to supporting 
authority, assert that this "eight year age difference is not 
sufficient to establish the fourth element of a prima face case." 
Brief of Appellees/Cross Appellants at 25.   
 A plaintiff under the ADEA need not show that the successful 
candidate was someone who was not in the protected class, i.e. 
below age 40.  All that need be shown is that the beneficiary of 
the alleged discrimination is "sufficiently younger" to permit an 
9 
inference of age discrimination.  Maxfield, 766 F.2d at 792 
("Courts that have addressed this issue squarely have universally 
permitted a prima facie case to be shown through proof that the 
favored person was younger than plaintiff.  All have held that 
the replacement need not be younger than 40, the age at which 
ADEA protection begins.") (collecting cases).  There is no 
magical formula to measure a particular age gap and determine if 
it is sufficiently wide to give rise to an inference of 
discrimination, however, case law assists our inquiry.  In Healy 
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1988), we 
concluded that nine years difference was sufficient to establish 
a prima facie case of age discrimination even though the 
favorably treated employee was also within the protected class, 
id. at 1214.6  In Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 
1981), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that five 
years difference, in addition to substantial evidence of 
plaintiff's qualifications for the position, was sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, id. at 533.7 
 It is clear that here, the eight year difference between 
Barber and the successful candidate, Kathy Ball, could support a 
finding that Ball was "sufficiently younger" than Barber to 
permit an inference of age discrimination.  That difference, 
                     
6
      In Healy, the employer ultimately prevailed because the 
employee was unable to show that the employer's proffered reason 
for the allegedly discriminatory treatment was a pretext for 
illegal discrimination.  Id. at 1220. 
7
      In Douglas, as in Healy, the employer ultimately prevailed 
because the nondiscriminatory justifications proffered for the 
employer's actions were credible.  Id. at 535. 
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together with the undisputed existence of the remaining elements 
of Barber's prima facie case, were clearly sufficient to shift 
the burden of production to the defendants and require them to 
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory motivation for their 
failure to promote Barber.  Thus, the district court properly 
ruled that Barber had established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. 
 However, the district court erred in concluding that Barber 
did not demonstrate that defendants' proffered business reasons 
were pretextual.  Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., No. 92-1241, 
slip op. at 3-4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1994).  The district court was 
obligated to review the record before it and determine if the 
evidence and the inferences that reasonably arose from it 
provided "any rational basis for the verdict."  Bhaya, 832 F.2d 
at 259 (emphasis added).  In Bhaya (a case very similar to this 
one) we reversed the district court's entry of judgment for the 
defendant employer and remanded the case for reinstatement of the 
jury verdict finding age discrimination.  Here, as in Bhaya  
 [t]he issue on this appeal is 
straightforward.  The jury has told us which 
explanation it believes, and we are bound by 
that finding if there is evidence of record 
to support it.  Our only inquiry is whether, 
taking the record as a whole and resolving 
all factual disputes in favor of the 
plaintiffs, the evidence and justifiable 
inferences therefrom reasonably support the 
plaintiffs' explanation.  We turn now to 
consider whether a reasonable juror could 
have concluded that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiffs because of their age. 
 
Id. at 260. 
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 The facts and reasonable inferences here clearly allow a 
reasonable juror to conclude that Barber's age was a motivating 
factor in his employer's refusal to promote him.  Defendants 
maintain that Barber was not awarded the position because "Kathy 
Ball was the best candidate" for the job, and they cite several 
legitimate considerations that they argue factored into the 
determination.  See Brief of Appellees/Cross Appellants at 11-12. 
That argument overlooks the procedural posture here. The jury has 
spoken.  Although the district court may have found the 
legitimate explanations credible, the jury did not.  That 
difference may well be nothing more than a different evaluation 
of the credibility of the various witnesses at trial. 
Nevertheless, this record does not allow the district judge to 
disregard the jury's determination of credibility and substitute 
it with his own.  
 Edmonds testified that he did not formally interview either 
of the two older candidates (Kelly or Barber) because he was 
familiar with their work as he had supervised both of them for 
nine months in the Pittsburgh sales office.  Barber notes that 
Edmonds had an opportunity to evaluate Kelly's performance as a 
salesman, but that he (Barber) was a Chief Clerk, and Edmonds had 
no basis to evaluate his abilities in sales.  Barber also argued 
that Kelly had an opportunity to informally discuss the position 
with Edmonds and eventually expressed his disinterest in the 
position after learning the proposed salary, whereas Barber was 
given no opportunity to discuss the position with Edmonds.   
12 
 The district court, apparently discredited Barber's 
arguments.  The court reasoned:  
It was undisputed, however, that . . . 
[Edmonds] was acquainted with plaintiff and 
the other older applicant because plaintiff 
and the other applicant had worked for the 
official in his department for a nine-month 
period preceding the time the employment 
decision was made.  The applicant who was 
promoted, as well as the other younger 
applicant, on the other hand, were unknown to 
[Edmonds], and he explained his desire to 
interview them to learn more about their 
qualifications for the position. 
 
Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., No. 92-1241, slip op. at 3 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1994).   
 The jury was entitled to credit Barber's arguments as more 
credible than the contrary explanations of his employer.  This is 
particularly true when we consider the "interview reports" that 
Edmonds completed.  The district court's opinion inexplicably 
overlooks the fact that Edmonds completed these reports for all 
candidates even though he only interviewed two of them.  The 
court also overlooks the fact that Barber's "interview report" 
dated April 5, 1990 refers to Ball as the candidate who had been 
selected for the job, but the jury could conclude from Ball's 
interview report that she had not been interviewed when Edmonds 
declared that she "had been" selected.  The district court was 
not free to ignore this testimony nor the inferences that this 
record supports.  "In crediting the defendants' explanation, the 
district court effectively reversed the requirement that in 
reviewing a jury verdict we are to draw all inferences in favor 
of the prevailing party."  Bhaya, 832 F.2d at 262.  "Evaluation 
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of witness credibility is the exclusive function of the jury, and 
where the only evidence of intent is oral testimony, a jury could 
always choose to discredit it."  Id.  See also Dreyer v. Arco 
Chem. Div. of Atl. Richfield, 801 F.2d 651, 655-56 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987).   
 The district court also stated that Barber had failed to 
persuade the court that defendants' explanation that it factored 
Barber's unwillingness to move into its decision was pretext. The 
district judge stated: 
In this regard, defendants offered 
uncontradicted evidence that the successful 
applicant was employed in the Baltimore area 
and would have to relocate in order to accept 
the position.  Defendants also took the 
position that an employee's willingness to 
relocate is evidence of the employee's 
loyalty and commitment to the employer. 
 
Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., No. 92-1241, slip op. at 3 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1994).  Although this testimony persuaded the 
court, it apparently did not persuade the jury.  This is 
understandable because there was also testimony that the position 
that Barber sought did not require relocation.  Accordingly, the 
record clearly supports the jury's rejection of this explanation. 
In fact, defendants concede that "Plaintiff properly states that 
willingness to relocate was not a job qualification."  Brief for 
Appellees/Cross Appellants at 28.   
 Defendants maintain that the district court's entry of 
judgment as a matter of law is consistent with our decision in 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994).  In Fuentes, we 
explained that a plaintiff satisfies the requisite quantum of 
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proof to rebut a defendant's stated legitimate business reason 
when the plaintiff produces evidence which: 
(1)  casts sufficient doubt upon each of the 
legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant 
so that a factfinder could reasonably 
conclude that each reason was a fabrication; 
or 
 
(2)  allows the factfinder to infer that 
discrimination was more likely than not a 
motivating or determinative cause of the 
adverse employment action. 
 
Id. at 762 (emphasis added).  Defendants place particular, if not 
exclusive, emphasis on the first of these criteria, arguing that 
Barber's rebuttal evidence must go to each of their proffered 
legitimate business reasons.  However, Fuentes also allows a 
plaintiff to more generally submit evidence raising an inference 
of discrimination.  Id.   
Hicks teaches . . . that rejection of the 
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason 
will permit the trier of fact to infer the 
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, 
so long as there is a finding of 
discrimination.  In other words, `[t]he 
factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put 
forward by the [employer] . . . may, together 
with the elements of the [employee's] prima 
facie case, suffice to show intentional 
discrimination.'"   
 
Seman, 26 F.3d at 433 (quoting Hicks,    U.S. at   , 113 S. Ct. 
at 2749 n.4) (citation and footnote omitted) (brackets in 
original).  Here, the record contained Defendants' inconsistent 
interview techniques, the pre-dated and inaccurate "interview 
report forms", and differing accounts of the relevance of Ball's 
willingness to relocate, all of which could have factored into a 
15 
jury's decision to discredit defendants' explanation that she was 
promoted over Barber because she was a better candidate than him. 
Therefore, we will reverse and remand for reinstatement of the 
jury's verdict in favor of Barber on his failure to promote 
claim. 
 
B.  RETALIATION CLAIM 
 Barber alleged that Edmonds eliminated the position of Chief 
Clerk to retaliate for the letter of complaint that Barber wrote 
to defendants' Human Resources Department, and that this 
retaliation violated the ADEA.  The ADEA states in part:  
(d)  It shall be unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment . . . because such 
individual, member or applicant for 
membership has opposed any practice made 
unlawful by this section, or because such 
individual, member or applicant for 
membership has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or litigation 
under this chapter. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 623(d).  The procedural framework in ADEA retaliation 
cases also follows that of Title VII disparate treatment cases as 
set forth in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05.  See Geary v. 
Visitation of Blessed Virgin Mary, 7 F.3d 324, 329 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Thus, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a 
plaintiff must show: (1) that he engaged in protected conduct; 
(2) that he was subject to an adverse employment action 
subsequent to such activity; and (3) that a causal link exists 
between the protected activity and the adverse action.  See Jalil 
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v. Advel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
403 U.S. 1023 (1990).   
 The district court concluded that Barber failed to establish 
a prima facie case of retaliation because he did not demonstrate 
"that he engaged in protected conduct."  Specifically, the court 
concluded "that the letter written by plaintiff to the Department 
of Human Resources was not a complaint opposing a practice made 
unlawful by the ADEA, nor was it a charge against defendants 
under Section 623 of the ADEA."  Barber v. CSX Distribution 
Servs., No. 92-1241, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1994).  As 
quoted above, Barber's letter to Human Resources complains about 
unfair treatment in general and expresses his dissatisfaction 
with the fact that someone else was awarded the position, but it 
does not specifically complain about age discrimination. 
Accordingly, the letter does not constitute the requisite 
"protected conduct" for a prima facie case of retaliation.   
 In reaching this conclusion, it is important to note that we 
do not require a formal letter of complaint to an employer or the 
EEOC as the only acceptable indicia of the requisite "protected 
conduct" under the ADEA.  See, e.g., Sumner v. United States 
Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that 
acceptable forms of protected activity under Title VII's 
analogous opposition clause include formal charges of 
discrimination "as well as informal protests of discriminatory 
employment practices, including making complaints to management, 
writing critical letters to customers, protesting against 
discrimination by industry or society in general, and expressing 
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support of co-workers who have filed formal charges").  It is 
neither necessary, nor appropriate to here attempt to define with 
precision the type of conduct that will give rise to a 
retaliation claim under the ADEA.  Our analysis requires only 
that we analyze the message that Barber conveyed, and not the 
medium of conveyance.    
 Barber's letter is just too vague to support a finding that 
his job was eliminated because he engaged in behavior that was 
protected under the ADEA.  A person has engaged in "protected 
conduct" when s/he "has opposed any practice made unlawful by . . 
. section [623]."  29 U.S.C. § 623(d).  The practice made 
unlawful by § 623 is "discriminat[ion] against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such an individual's age." 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).  Thus, the statute provides that a person has 
engaged in "protected conduct" when s/he opposes discrimination 
on the basis of age.  It is clear from Barber's letter that he 
felt that he had been treated unfairly as he stated that "the 
position was awarded to a less qualified individual."  However, 
that letter does not explicitly or implicitly allege that age was 
the reason for the alleged unfairness.  A general complaint of 
unfair treatment does not translate into a charge of illegal age 
discrimination.  The jury was not presented with any evidence to 
support its conclusion that Barber's position was eliminated 
because he engaged in protected activity.  Accordingly, the 
district court properly granted the defendants' motion for 
judgment as a matter of law on that portion of Barber's claim.  
18 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the order of 
judgment as a matter of law and remand the matter for 
reinstatement of the jury verdict in favor of Barber relative to 
the age discrimination claim but affirm the order of judgment as 
a matter of law on the retaliation claim. 
